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According to a widespread view, Germany’s unemployment crisis is caused by ri-
gid labour markets, low profitability and increasing international competition.
We argue that this view does not provide a convincing explanation for the dra-
matic rise in Germany’s unemployment rate since 1989, first because no distinc-
tion is drawn between the situation in the Eastern part of Germany and that in the
Western part of Germany, and second because supply-side conditions in the We-
stern part of Germany have not generally deteriorated. We argue that Germany’s
slump is the result of a series of adverse supply and demand shocks since unifica-
tion. Supply shocks dominated in the East, demand shocks in the West. These
shocks were mainly policy-induced. The adoption of an extremely overvalued ex-
change rate and rapid wage increases in East Germany magnified the general
problems of transition, resulting in a loss of employment of more than a third and
a sustained structural weakness of its economy. The wage explosion was made
possible by the government’s failure to create a proper institutional framework
for wage negotiations. The unification shock to the East added at least 2.5 per-
centage points to Germany’s overall unemployment rate, as measured by the
OECD definition. We attribute some 1.5 to 2.5 percentage points of the present
unemployment rate to the weak economic growth of the last several years and the
impact of the increasing tax wedge on the wage level. Weak growth has been lar-
gely the consequence of uncoordinated, contradictory and procyclical macroeco-
nomic policies that have been adopted since unification, while the increasing tax
wedge has been mostly driven by the decision of the government to finance unifi-
cation partly through the social security system. Econometric evidence suggests a
structural break in aggregate wage-setting in West Germany, with increased no-
minal flexibility in recent years and insignificant persistent effects since the
1980s. Hence, aggregate wage setting in the Western part of Germany is highly
responsive to unemployment, while in the Eastern part, it is not.Contents
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Since unification, Germany’s unemployment increased substantially, both in
comparison to the previous decade and to other OECD countries (graph 1). In-
cluding the East, the rate of unemployment has almost doubled since 1989.
Measured by the OECD definition, it is now at 10 percent, while another 5 per
cent of the labour force is supported by various labour market policies while not
actively seeking a job.2 After a dramatic rise in 1996 and 1997, unemployment is
expected to stabilise in 1998. However, Germany is not in the midst of what
economists would typically call a recession. Rather, Germany suffers from a sus-
tained slump. After the recovery from the 1992/93 recession, equipment invest-
ment in West Germany almost stagnated for three years and only recently started
to increase (graph 2). Even in the East, investment activity is slackening while
unemployment has risen again. Without doubt, Germany is in the midst of the
worst labour market slump in postwar history.
By and large, economists in Germany share the widespread view that Ger-
many’s unemployment crisis is rooted in rigid labour markets, low profitability
and increasing international competition.3 The empirical evidence that has been
disseminated in the economic policy debate appears to be so convincing that eco-
nomists have become concerned more with the inability of the political system to
implement structural reforms than with diagnosis itself.
We argue that the prevailing view cannot convincingly explain the rise in Ger-
many’s unemployment since 1989. This is because the impact of unification on
Germany’s economy is insufficiently recognised. Unification raised the Federal
Republic’s population by a quarter, it was accompanied by a fall in East Ger-
many’s level of employment of more than a third, it created an income gap of 300
per cent within the nation, and it led to a gross reallocation of an annual 7 per
cent of West Germany’s GDP to the East. We argue that most, if not all of the in-
                                                
1 For helpful comments, we would like to thank Bart van Ark, Herbert Brücker, Wendy Carlin,
Jakob de Haan, Lutz Hoffmann, Philipp Maier, Kees van Paridon, Werner Smolny, Friederike
Spiecker, and Viktor Steiner. This paper also appears in the Duitsland Cahier of the Duitsland
Instituut at the University of Amsterdam.
2 Sachverständigenrat (1997), pp. 96, 317; authors’ calculations.
3 The literature by labour economists tends to deliver a less clear-cut diagnosis. For surveys, see
Franz and Steiner (1995), Franz (1996a) pp. 341-392, Franz (1997).– 2 –
crease in unemployment should be attributed to unification and the economic po-
licies adopted thereafter.
However, it is difficult to express the effect of unification on the German
economy in an analytically accurate way because unification created a dual econ-
omy with strong interdependencies. For the sake of simplification, we frequently
treat the situation in the ‘two Germanys’ separately. We suggest a threefold de-
composition of the rise in the unemployment rate into (i) a unification effect, vi-
sible as a ‘jump’ in the unemployment rate by two percentage points in 1992,
where the standardised unemployment rate was for the first time reported for
Germany as a whole; (ii) a recession effect in the form of an increase in 1993/94,
and (iii) a stagnation effect in the form of a lack of decline in 1995 and a strong
increase in 1996/97. We consider the failure of unemployment to decline since
the last recession to be the real puzzle.
Before we indicate how this puzzle could be solved, we deal with the unifica-
tion shock (part 2). Thereafter, we structure our discussion around three broad
sets of questions: Have macroeconomic supply-side conditions in the western
part of Germany deteriorated since the late 1980s (part 3)? Have labour markets
Graph 1 Unemployment rates compared, 1970-97
a
(in per cent, standardised OECD data)















a) The values for 1997 are based on seasonally adjusted figures for the  first three quarters.
Sources: OECD, Quarterly Labour Force Statistics, various issues; authors’ calculations.– 3 –
become more rigid in microeconomic terms, or do labour and product market
rigidities constitute the major constraint to higher employment (part 4)? Can a
series of adverse demand-shocks account for the rise in unemployment, and if so,
was there a better policy mix available (part 5)?
2 The unification shock
Unification was met by a declining economy in the East and a prospering econ-
omy in the West. Since the early 1980s, macroeconomic supply-side conditions
had improved substantially in West Germany.4 Corporate profitability recovered
to the level of the early 1970s while effective average tax rates on profit income
experienced a significant decline. The budget of the public sector was consolida-
ted, and in 1989 a small surplus was achieved. The rate of inflation declined to 2
                                                
4 See, inter alia, Sachverständigenrat (1988), and Giersch, Paqué and Schmieding (1992).
Graph 2 Equipment investment and employment in West Germany, 1970-97
(annual average growth rates, quarterly data, in per cent)



















Total economy; equipment investment at constant prices; employment refers to the total number
of persons employed. Seasonally adjusted data, the years refer to the first quarter. 1) The decline
in investment in early 1984 was strongly influenced by a strike in the metal-working industry and
a temporary investment tax credit granted in the previous year. Sources: DIW, Vierteljährliche
volkswirtschaftliche Gesamtrechnung; authors’ calculations.– 4 –
per cent annually, supported by falling world market prices for oil. From 1985 to
1989, 1.2 million jobs were created, 0.7 million of which were in the service sec-
tor. The standardised unemployment rate declined parallel with that of the U.S.
Seen from a supply-side perspective, the main shortcomings were a more funda-
mental tax reform, high subsidies to allying sectors such as agriculture, coal and
steel, and insufficient progress in privatisation and deregulation. Long-term un-
employment was above the level of the 1970s but substantially below that of
most other European countries. The enormous increase in the current account
surplus, reaching a level of 5 per cent of GDP in 1989, gave rise to concerns.
Nevertheless, Germany was probably economically better prepared for unifica-
tion than at any time since the 1960s. What went wrong?
In West Germany, unification led to a strong but rather short-lived boom; the
unemployment rate fell temporarily to near 4 per cent. Meanwhile, East Germany
experienced one of the worst depressions in modern economic history.5 Jobless-
ness increased within two years from virtually zero to more than 30 per cent of
the work force. The labour market slump started with the introduction of the D-
mark on 1
st July 1990 (graph 3). Despite warnings by many experts, the Bundes-
bank included, the government decided to convert flow values, in particular out-
put prices and wages, by a 1:1 rate; stock values, in particular corporate debt,
were converted by 2 GDR-mark per D-mark. It became apparent later on that the
1:1 conversion factor implied a revaluation of output prices of East German firms
by more than 300 per cent.6 Furthermore, with the introduction of the D-mark,
East German consumers switched to Western goods that were previously not
available or not affordable. This magnified the output collapse in import-compe-
ting sectors while those producers that gained a comparative advantage were
barely prepared to satisfy a potentially higher output demand. The extreme appre-
ciation of product prices and the change in the demand structure were the most
important causes for the dramatic decline in domestic demand for East German
products. Foreign sales were partly stabilised by subsidised exports to the
COMECON member states. After these subsidies were phased out, a loss of the
                                                
5 For more details, see Sinn and Sinn (1991), Hoffmann (1992, 1993), Flassbeck and Horn
(1996), and the various “Adjustment Reports“ by the Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsfor-
schung, Institut für Weltwirtschaft, and the Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (1991 ff).
6 For more details, see Akerlof et al. (1991), Sinn and Sinn (1991), pp. 41-50.– 5 –
markets in Eastern Europe followed the loss of the domestic market. Within less
than a year, East Germany’s commodity production dropped by 50 per cent.
Employment experienced a sustained decline until 1992. Measured against the
1989 level of nearly 10 million, more than 3.5 million jobs had been lost. Only
about one third of this decline in employment occurred in the form of rising un-
employment. About one million persons found a new job in West Germany, ei-
ther as commuters or as migrants. A further 0.9 million people went into early re-
tirement, training and job-creating schemes, or withdrew from the labour force.
Without these measures, the present unemployment rate in East Germany would
have been at more than 30 per cent instead of the actual level of 17 per cent (by
national definition).
The extent of job loss has no parallel in other transition economies in Central
and Eastern Europe.7 At first glance, this development is surprising because East
Germany’s accession to the Federal Republic solved two fundamental problems
                                                
7 Blanchard (1997), chapter 1.
Graph 3 Production and employment in East Germany, 1989-96
(1990.2 = 100)













Quarterly data, GDP and commodity production at constant prices. The huge adjustment in rela-
tive prices since unification suggests that one should interpret the output data for 1989-91 merely
as tendency indicators. Sources: DIW, Vierteljährliche volkswirtschaftliche Gesamtrechnung;
authors’ calculations.– 6 –
of the transition process virtually overnight – monetary stabilisation and the
creation of a legal order for the market economy. Moreover, unification with the
wealthy West Germany promised a much faster and larger inflow of funds for
infrastructure and private investment. Both should have contributed to a shorter
transition crisis and a faster process of catching-up. The main reason for the dra-
matic decline in employment were the introduction of a highly overvalued ex-
change rate and extremely rapid wage increases (graph 4). Between early 1990
and the middle of 1991, real product wages almost doubled while productivity
stagnated. Moreover, wages continued to rise despite strongly increasing unem-
ployment.
How was this possible? The most popular, but never fully-elaborated explana-
tion is the “conspiracy hypothesis“. It states that the huge wage increase was the
outcome of an agreement between West Germany’s employer’s associations and
unions that took over wage negotiations in the East. Both parties wanted to limit
competition from the East. Employers feared low price competition on the pro-
duct market, while unions wanted to prevent mass migration to the West which
would put pressure on the existing wage level. Because social security benefits
became tied to wages in the East as well, the collective bargaining parties were
able to externalise the cost of mass unemployment to the social security system.
It has also been suggested that the wage hike helped Western unions to increase
their membership in the East (Burda 1991). In its most extreme version, the argu-
ment goes that the driving force behind the wage hike came only from West Ger-
man unions which were prepared to risk a mass destruction of East German em-
ployment in order to preserve their cartel power in the West (von Hagen 1997).
However, this account overlooks a number of important aspects.8 The rapid
wage increases in the months before and after the currency reform were mainly
based on contracts made under the old regime. Initially, the managers of the
state-owned companies, whose salaries were tied to the average wage, and West
German employer’s organisations bargained with representatives of the West
German unions that quickly replaced the communist labour organisations. The
negotiations took place at a climax of high expectations, nourished by leading
West German politicians who promised “flourishing landscapes”. It was gener-– 7 –
ally expected that East Germany’s economy would be rebuilt rather quickly along
the lines of the highly-developed western part of Germany, driven by a massive
inflow of private and public investment. It was even suggested that wages should
take the lead in East Germany’s catching-up process, although many experts
warned of the disastrous consequences, in particular in conjunction with the pro-
posed currency reform. East German workers were clearly interested in wage in-
creases, but not at the price of massive job losses. While one major objective of
the Western union leadership was indeed to limit mass migration from the East,
it is unlikely that unions were initially prepared to tolerate a massive job loss in
the East, particularly because this would have jeopardised a large part of the new
union membership in the East, adding 50 per cent to membership in the West.
It was only in the new round of wage negotiations in the second half of 1990
that the unemployment benefits became tied to the average wage level, as is the
                                                
8 For more details, see Scheremet (1996) and Scheremet and Zwiener (1996); for related
arguments, see Sinn and Sinn (1991), pp. 155-8, and Franz (1992).
Graph 4 Productivity and wages in East Germany, 1990-96
(D-mark per hour at 1991 prices, logarithmic scale)










Quarterly data, GDP and hourly wages at constant prices, GDP deflator. The huge adjustment in
relative prices and the changing composition of demand since 1991 suggests that the GDP defla-
tor has a substantial measurement bias. However, this bias affects productivity and product
wages equally. Sources: DIW, Vierteljährliche volkswirtschaftliche Gesamtrechnung; authors’
calculations.– 8 –
case in West Germany. Under these circumstances, the disposable income of dis-
missed workers increased even after dismissal, if the wage settlements were high
enough. Moreover, eventual losses incurred by East German firms would partly
be covered by the privatisation agency, the Treuhandanstalt, and hence by the Fe-
deral budget. Despite the fact that the Treuhandanstalt owned a majority of firms
in East Germany well into 1992, it was legally not entitled to bargain on behalf
of the firms in its portfolio. The government hesitated to become directly in-
volved in the wage bargaining process because this would have created tensions
with the German constitution that protects the freedom of collective bargaining
among private parties. Moreover, a government intervention would have been
highly unpopular in the East. The wage hike abated with increasing privatisation,
because private ownership meant that the employers’ side incurred losses from
excessive wage increases. Hence, the ultimate cause for the disastrous wage hike
was the institutional vacuum the government created in the East: wage bargain-
ing without ownership responsibility and without a threat of income losses
through unemployment.
East Germany’s labour market stabilised from 1992 to 1995. While manufac-
turing and the public sector continued to downsize, new jobs were created in the
construction sector and in private services. Investment in construction has served
as a pillar of economic development. The construction boom has been largely
driven by massive government support. Although overall productivity improved
substantially since 1992 and clearly outpaced the increase in wages (graph 4), the
share of gross profits in the GDP is still only at 30 per cent, while it is at 48 per
cent in the West. Hence, growth still depends on huge transfers from the West.
Moreover, part of these transfers, in particular generous tax allowances for inve-
stors, have favoured capital-intensive investment projects that had a comparative-
ly low impact on the level of employment. After the massive subsidisation of in-
vestment in building expired at the end of 1996, unemployment in East Germany
rose again and the rate of output growth started to fall behind that of West Ger-
many.9 On top of that, the government decided to phase out a number of labour
market programs. Both contributed to an additional increase of 0.5 per cent in
Germany’s overall unemployment rate.
                                                
9 See DIW, IfW, and IfW (1991 ff.).– 9 –
 Overall, the ‘East-Germany’ effect contributed directly to at least 2.5 percen-
tage points of the rise in Germany’s overall unemployment rate since 1989, if
measured by the OECD definition. On top of that, there may be an indirect effect
because about one million East Germans shifted their labour supply to the West,
either as migrants or as commuters. The unification shock may have contributed
to an increase in the West German rate of unemployment as well, if the macro-
economic wage-setting did not fully take this additional labour supply into ac-
count. Section 3.3 addresses this question.
3 Supply-side problems? Macroeconomics
The analysis thus far suggests that the huge increase in East Germany’s unem-
ployment rate in 1990-92 was caused by the adoption of a highly overvalued ex-
change rate, extremely rapid wage increases and the general problems of transi-
tion, while the increase in West Germany’s unemployment rate in 1993/94 can
largely be attributed to the sharp recession. What remains puzzling is the failure
of the unemployment rate to decline afterwards, as would normally happen in the
wake of a sustained business cycle upswing. If Germany had experienced a nor-
mal recovery, this would indicate that structural unemployment has increased.
Yet Germany experienced its slowest recovery in postwar history. One may be
tempted to conclude that the burden of unification, namely a substantial increase
in social security contributions and taxes, has led to excessive wage increases
and a corporate profit squeeze rendering a recovery of investment and employ-
ment impossible. Moreover, the corporate sector might have responded with in-
creasing investment abroad, while price competitiveness in the tradable sector
might have substantially deteriorated. On top of that, the fiscal deficit may have
crowded out investment.
In the following, we look at profitability and taxation (3.1), at the ubiquitous
‘competitiveness’ issue (3.2) and at macroeconomic wage-setting (3.3). The ana-
lysis refers, as far as this is still possible, to the western part of Germany.
3.1 Profitability
In Germany, supply-side economists have traditionally combined classical econo-
mics which focuses on income distribution and investment with neo-classical– 10 –
economics which emphasises incentives and factor substitution. In a nutshell, the
model can be summarised as follows: investment requires profits; profits arise
from entrepreneurial activities; and wages, taxes, regulations and inflation threa-
ten profits. Hence, the government should create supply-side conditions that al-
low entrepreneurs to realise profits. It is argued that unemployment mainly comes
from excessive and inflexible wages which lead to lower investment and higher
capital intensity. Disequilibrium wages are attributed to union bargaining power
and to labour market regulations. Although the possibility of demand-side prob-
lems is not ruled out on purely theoretical grounds as is the case with ‘New Clas-
sical Macroeconomics’, it is argued that in reality, the demand side has never
been a lasting constraint to higher output and employment. Since the 1980s, this
approach has dominated economic policy and policy-oriented research.10
The rate of profit, the share of profit and the taxation of profit income have
traditionally played a key role in explaining investment behaviour. For the pre-
sent purpose, we choose the rate of profit in the business sector and the average
effective rate of taxation on profits. We ignore the share of profit because this in-
dicator has a weaker theoretical foundation, although its development would sup-
port the following argument even more. There are various measures for the rate
of profit. For our purpose, it is most useful to use the measure of the Council of
Economic Experts (graph 5), with one modification: In order to control for de-
mand-side effects, we have calculated the rate of profit at full capacity utilisa-
tion. The empirical evidence shows that aggregate profitability in Germany expe-
rienced a sustained decline from the early 1970s to the early 1980s and a sus-
tained improvement until the early 1990s. The remarkable feature of the 1993
recession was a relatively short decline and a very rapid recovery of full-utilisa-
tion profitability. The profitability in Germany as a whole is lower due to the East
Germany effect but it shows a sustained improvement in the last several years.
Overall, there is no indication that a slump in pre-tax profitability since the 1993
recession can explain the weak investment performance in West Germany. 11
                                                
10 See, inter alia, the annual reports of the Council of Economic Experts. For an application to
Germany’s postwar history, see Giersch, Paqué, and Schmieding (1992).
11 Alternative estimates of the rate of return in the privat sector are broadly consistent with this
statement, c.f. Boss et al. (1997), p. 48, and OECD (1997c), p. A28.– 11 –
However, the Council of Economic Experts has recently emphasised, among
other things, that manufacturing profitability has substantially deteriorated since
the end of 1980s and that the massive outflow of foreign direct investment (FDI)
indicates higher profits abroad.12 We leave the latter question for the next section
and note here only that a profitability problem in manufacturing at constant ag-
gregate profitability implies a boost of profitability in other sectors. This should
have led to an expansion of investment and employment in those sectors. This
was not the case. One might argue that excessive product market regulations in
the service sector prevented higher investment. In section 4.2, we show that the
evidence does not lend clear support to this view.
Even if the pre-tax rate of return in West Germany’s private sector does not
indicate a profitability problem, it might be the case that the burden of unifica-
tion, requiring an annual gross transfer of 7 per cent of GDP to the East,13 ad-
versely affected investment. However, annual net transfers to the East required
only 4 per cent of West Germany’s GDP because the Federal budget also re-
ceived tax revenues from the East. The transfers to the East were mainly financed
by an increase in the budget deficit and by higher social security contributions
and taxes. Initially, public expenditures in the West were cut only moderately.
There are two principal channels by which this kind of fiscal policy can exert
a negative impact on private sector investment activity: via crowding out or via
higher taxes on profits. One fact that speaks in favour of the crowding-out hy-
pothesis is that during 1989/90, the long-term interest rate rose by nearly two
percentage points in nominal terms and by one percentage point in real terms.14
Apparently, financial markets expected higher deficits and higher inflation. How-
ever, the increase in the long-term interest rate was short-lived. During all of the
1990s, the real interest rate was on average slightly lower than during the 1980s.
While it cannot be ruled out a priori that compensatory forces were at work, it
appears that Germany is well-integrated into the world capital market and that
                                                
12 Sachverständigenrat (1997), pp. 47-49; see also Carlin and Soskice (1997), pp. 58, 73-4, who
argue on the basis of manufacturing that low profitability is Germany’s most critical problem.
13 Heilemann and Rappen (1996).
14 OECD, Economic Outlook Database (November 1997); authors’ calculations; real interest
rates were calculated, using the GDP deflator of the same year.– 12 –
the unification-induced budget deficit, 4 per cent of GDP, was too small to signi-
ficantly impact the world interest rate.
The widespread complaints about excessive income taxes in Germany’s busi-
ness community suggest that the burden of unification may have largely been
shouldered by profits. Yet this is not true. Rather, the average effective rate of
taxes on profits continued to decline that had started in the early 1980s (graph 6),
largely due to a succession of smaller tax reforms and more-generous rules for
the determination of the tax base. The average tax on profits is now substantially
lower than during the early 1970s, while taxes on labour and social security con-
tributions continue to increase. The sustained decline in the average tax rate on
profits since unification can largely be explained by the very generous deprecia-
tion allowances that the government introduced to encourage private investment
in the East. This effect out-weighted the increase in income tax rate by 7.5 per
cent of the tax burden to finance unification (Solidaritätszuschlag).
Graph 5 Rates of return on fixed capital in the business sector
in Germany, 1970-1997
 (at full capacity utilisation
1; in per cent)











Gross operating surplus minus imputed labour income from entrepreneurial activity relative to
the net capital stock at purchaser prices (including inventories); private sector without agricul-
ture. From 1996 on, data for West Germany are not provided. Estimate for 1997. Capacity utili-
sation refers to West Germany throughout. 1) In order to control for cyclical influences, the rate
of return has been divided by capacity utilisation. The effect of utilisation on profitability is,
however, small. Source: Sachverständigenrat 1997, pp. 255-6; authors’ calculations.– 13 –
The German tax system has high statutory tax rates on corporate income but
the corporate tax base is exceptionally low, owing to generous depreciation allo-
wances and fairly liberal accounting standards. This explains why average effec-
tive taxes on profit are low even by international standards.15 In 1996, the govern-
ment suggested a tax reform that would bring income taxation more in line with
international standards, namely by reducing the maximum statutory tax rate to 39
per cent and by broadening the tax basis through lower depreciation allowances,
tighter accounting rules and fewer exemptions. In effect, the tax system would
have become more transparent, less distortionary and less prone to tax evasion.
Although the government proposal initially implied a net reduction of the overall
tax burden of some one per cent of GDP, this was clearly in conflict with the
need to meet the fiscal convergence criteria of the Maastricht treaty. Given the
weak state of the economy, the government promised that the tax reform would
deliver substantial gains in investment and employment, in particular through
more direct investment from abroad. These promises were generally criticised as
exaggerated.
In 1997, the tax reform failed because the political opposition raised equity
concerns and assumed its veto power in the second chamber (Bundesrat), while
the government was not prepared to make concessions to an extent which would
have been interpreted as political weakness. The failure of the tax reform has led
to widespread frustration, and it has become increasingly common to argue that
the German tax system discourages investment. While this argument is not con-
vincing on logical grounds,16 the failure of the tax reform certainly gave a bad
signal to investors in the context of a bad state of the economy. However, in the
absence of a reliable impact analysis and in view of the already-low average ef-
fective tax rate on profit income, we find those arguments unconvincing which
attribute the persistent slack in investment and employment to the failure of the
tax reform. But this conclusion is also based on our analysis of Germany’s ex-
ternal position to which we now turn.
                                                
15 OECD (1997b), p. 22. International comparisons of marginal effective tax rates based on a
neoclassical investment model suggest that Germany’s tax system is broadly supportive to
investment; see Jorgenson (1993), Köddermann and Wilhelm (1996), pp. 93-99.– 14 –
3.2 ‘Competitiveness’
There exists a widespread belief that Germany faces a structural ‘competitiveness
problem’ due to excessive wage costs and high tax rates. It is argued that a cost
problem in trade and Germany’s limited attractiveness for foreign capital have
contributed to the dramatic fall in industrial production and employment during
the 1993 recession and to the disappointing investment and employment perfor-
mance since 1995. This assessment has been endorsed in a sustained campaign
by the employers’ associations. Initially, it also found support with the govern-
                                                
16 An inefficient tax system that is broadly supportive to investment does not discourage in-
vestment simply because it has not been replaced by a more efficient tax system that is
Graph 6 Average effective tax rates on wages and profits in Germany,
1970-97 (in percent of the respective tax base)













From 1990 onward, unless otherwise stated, Germany as a whole. Wages refer to total gross
labour compensation. Taxes on wages include income tax before child care allowances (Kinder-
geld) plus the share in ‘solidarity tax’ plus tax refunds for employees (§46 EStG). Taxes on profits
include personal income tax (veranlagte Einkommensteuer) plus the share in ‘solidarity tax’ plus
tax refunds for employees (§46 EStG), corporate income tax, other taxes from profit, taxes on prop-
erty and taxes on business (Gewerbesteuer). Estimate for 1997. Sources: Statistisches Bundesamt,
Bundesministerium der Finanzen, estimates by the DIW; authors’ calculations.– 15 –
ment.17 By now, probably a majority of academic economists are prepared to link
Germany’s unemployment crisis to a problem in competing internationally. For
example, the scientific advisory board to the Ministry of Economic Affairs has
delivered an analysis of ‘long-term unemployment’ arguing:
“Sustained unemployment is above all a concomitant of increasing competition in a
rapidly-integrating world economy. [..] Germany as a location (Standort Deutsch-
land) competes internationally with its institutional framework and its factor cost for
mobile capital that creates new jobs. Those countries that fall short in competition
have to face unemployment, a declining propensity to invest and lower growth rates.
In this case, capital intensity increases at home while new jobs are created abroad.
Today, Germany has the highest wage costs, on average a low return on capital, and
paralysing regulations which also apply to the labour market. The tax burden is far
higher than for Germany’s most important competitors on the world market. The so-
cial expenditure rate is very high and still increasing. Consequently, the propensity
to invest at home is declining while the propensity to invest abroad is increasing.“18
This reasoning contrasts strongly with traditional doctrine of international eco-
nomics. Broadly speaking, the traditional doctrine is centred around three con-
cepts: Comparative advantage, purchasing power parity (PPP) and the adjustment
mechanism. The principle of comparative advantage states that countries export
those goods that they can produce relatively cheaply and import those goods that
they cannot. In long-run equilibrium, trade is based on specialisation among
countries along comparative advantage, while the exchange rate reflects the PPP
of the respective currencies in their tradable sector. Hence, all trading countries
are, so to speak, equally ‘competitive’, regardless of their absolute level of costs.
Comparative advantage and PPP are linked by the adjustment mechanism.
A problem of ‘competitiveness’ arises if, for whatever reason, the exchange
rate becomes overvalued in comparison to PPP. Correspondingly, the domestic
tradable sector suffers a profit squeeze. Overvaluation is usually accompanied by
a loss of currency reserves. This requires adjustment of the real exchange rate. In
the case of flexible exchange rates, adjustment implies that the nominal exchange
rate has to depreciate at a constant rate of domestic inflation. In the case of fixed
exchange rates, the rate of domestic inflation has to fall at a constant nominal ex-
                                                
broadly supportive to investment.
17 Bundesregierung (1993).– 16 –
change rate. The main disagreement in the literature is to what extent real eco-
nomic activity is involved in the adjustment process, how persistent deviations
from PPP can be, and to what extent international asset markets influence the ad-
justment process.19
The traditional approach assumes implicitly that trade is balanced in equilibri-
um. More recently, it has been emphasised that deficits or surpluses in the cur-
rent account may be an equilibrium phenomenon, reflecting differences in natio-
nal savings behaviour between countries.20 For example, if consumers at home
have a lower rate of time preference than consumers abroad, the respective coun-
try will initially be a net importer of savings (i.e. capital). It has been stressed
that differences in government savings behaviour have a similar effect on the
current account.
In the German economic policy debate, this reasoning has been largely pushed
into the background by the doctrine of ‘locational competition’ (Standortwettbe-
werb).21 Theoretically, it is a broad generalisation of the concept of tax competi-
tion. It is argued that with growing internationalisation of economic activities,
nation-states compete for internationally mobile factors of production, namely
capital. Countries with open and flexible markets, relatively low wages and ta-
xes, and a sufficient provision of local public goods, namely infrastructure, are
expected to attract more internationally-mobile capital than other countries. It is
believed that the pace of globalisation has dramatically increased in the 1990s
and that factor demand has consequently become substantially more elastic with
respect to the factor price. In the case of labour, it is suggested that a high wage
                                                
18 Wissenschaftlicher Beirat (1996), pp. 30-1, translation by the authors; similar arguments can
be found in Sachverständigenrat (1995 ff). However, in earlier reports such as those from
1988 and 1992 complaints about Germany’s competitive position were not supported.
19 See Dornbusch and Giovanini (1990), and Isard (1995).
20 See, inter alia, Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996).
21 So far, the concept of ‘locational competition’ has had little impact on the international lite-
rature. The catalogue of the Library of Congress just lists Siebert (1995) under this heading.
The catalogue of the Kiel library scores 13 items, most of them published by the Kiel Insti-
tute. The database of the Journal of Economic Literature which contains all articles pub-
lished in significant journals since 1969 scores only 4 papers, six including ‘Standortwettbe-
werb’. ‘Tax competition’, however, appears 96 times in the title. All this should not come as
a surprise, because the only elaborate model of ‘locational competition’ is the recently pub-
lished dissertation by the Kiel economist Lorz (1997). For an overview, see Siebert (1996).– 17 –
level provides firms an incentive not only to increase capital intensity at home
(upward movement on the labour demand curve) but also to relocate the entire
production process abroad (inward shift of the labour demand curve). Further-
more, an increase in capital costs through higher tax rates is expected to magnify
the impact of substitution of capital by labour (upward movement on the de-
mand-for-capital curve) through a dislocation to countries where capital costs
have remained unchanged or declined (inward shift of the demand-for-capital
curve). If real wages are not sufficiently flexible, unemployment will increase
with growing ‘locational competition’.
In the following, we leave aside theoretical considerations and concentrate on
two empirical questions, closely related to the doctrine of ‘locational competi-
tion’: (i) is there a positive and increasing net outflow of internationally-mobile
capital from Germany, and (ii) if so, is this net outflow a main cause for the
slump in domestic investment since 1994? Judged by Germany’s current account,
we could close the investigation immediately. Since unification, Germany has
transformed from a net exporter of capital to a net importer of capital (graph 7).
This appears to be completely at odds with the widespread image of capital leav-
ing Germany on a massive scale. However, the swing in Germany’s current ac-
count has been strongly influenced by unification: from 1989 to 1991, the public
sector budget balance swung from a slight surplus to a massive deficit. The flow
of private capital to the East only gradually increased, and little came from
abroad. Given the huge investment requirements in the East and the natural de-
sire of its inhabitants to narrow the consumption gap to the West, one could ar-
gue that the current account deficit is less than one would expect.– 18 –
However, the focus of concern is not on the capital accounts but on direct in-
vestment abroad that is believed to have crowded out investment in the domestic
economy. The key piece of evidence, regularly cited in policy papers and in the
business press, is a figure derived from Germany’s balance-of-payments statistic
showing an increasing outflow of FDI, in particular in the last several years,
while inflows almost stagnate. While this development has widely been inter-
preted as an indication for Germany’s limited attractiveness for foreign investors
and as contributing factor to the labour market slump (Franz 1997), it has re-
mained unclear how large the adverse effect on domestic investment was. If we
follow this line of reasoning, we can provide a rough estimate. Assuming that
other forms of international capital flows such as portfolio investment and credits
are not relevant to domestic investment,22 that each unit of FDI is equal to one
                                                
22 We note that Germany’s balance on portfolio investment records a substantial net-inflow.
From 1990-96, it was 60 per cent higher than the recorded net-outflow of FDI; see Sachver-
ständigenrat (1997), p. 387, authors’ calculations
Graph 7 Current account and public sector budget balance
in Germany, 1980-1997
(in per cent of GDP)











Semi-annual data, the years refer to the first half of the year. Partly estimates for 1997. Sources:
OECD, Economic Outlook Database (November 1997); authors’ calculations.– 19 –
unit of physical investment,23 and that FDI and private domestic investment are
close substitutes, we are able to calculate a counterfactual level of private dome-
stic investment. If since 1989 net-outflows of FDI had remained a constant
fraction of GDP, private domestic investment in GDP in 1996 would have been at
19.1 per cent of GDP instead of the actual 18.5 per cent.24
Even this fairly moderate number may be too large. A recent Bundesbank
study25 shows that there are large discrepancies between the inflowing FDI as re-
ported in Germany's balance of payments statistics and the corresponding figures
reported in the outflow data of the respective home countries. To take the most
important example: From 1984 to 1994, the U.S. balance of payments statistics
reported an outflow of FDI to Germany of 32 billion D-marks while the German
balance of payments statistics reported -6 billion DM, i.e. a declining stock of
FDI. The main reason for this discrepancy is that the German statistic has not yet
followed the international convention of reporting credits between the mother
companies and their German affiliates as FDI. Furthermore, the U.S., the largest
direct investor in Germany, records much higher reinvested profits, partly due to
different measurement conventions. The Bundesbank study suggests that, on the
whole, German data on FDI inflows show a much higher measurement bias than
those derived from outflow data of other OECD countries.
Graph 8 compares the FDI inflows to Germany as measured by German bal-
ance-of-payments statistics with the FDI inflows that a Bundesbank study has
constructed from outflow data of other OECD countries. The alternative inflow
data also seems to be more in line with what one would expect from economic
theory (Caves 1996). The move towards the Single Market, unification and the
opening up of Eastern Europe should have made Germany more attractive as a
location for FDI. This was underscored by the unification boom. FDI showed a
strong increase in 1989-91, also relative to GDP and to the overall FDI inflows in
the OECD. In contrast, the official data merely show a short increase in 1989,
and little inflow thereafter. If those data were correct, Germany’s new locational
                                                
23 Which is wrong because, on average, 80 per cent of world-wide FDI merely involves change
of ownership, say Volkswagen buys Rolls Royce.
24 Sachverständigenrat (1997), table 65*, Statistisches Bundesamt, Fachserie 18, Reihe 1.3,
1996; authors’ calculations.
25 Jost (1997), summarised and extended in Deutsche Bundesbank (1997).– 20 –
advantage would have been wiped out in a single year, i.e. 1990. The subsequent
recession and the appreciation of the D-mark are likely to have discouraged FDI
inflows. The alternative figures mirror this development much more clearly than
the official ones.
In 1995, the gross outflow of FDI, as measured by German statistics, increased
from 28 billion to 55 billion D-marks.26 This gave rise to much concern. Surpri-
singly, however, the alternative outflow statistics suggest that in 1995, FDI in-
flows to Germany more than doubled (graph 8), although it is unclear why. Fi-
nally, the development of the alternative net balance of FDI suggests that the
slump in domestic investment has not been caused to any significant degree by a
decline in Germany’s attractiveness for FDI, let alone for other forms of capital.
We will deal with the concerns of the ‘traditional doctrine’ about overvaluation
and trade performance in section 5.
3.3 Wage-setting
Rigidities in macroeconomic wage determination have always played a promi-
nent role in explaining Germany’s high unemployment rate. However, many par-
ticipants in the economic policy debate tend to derive the existence of rigidities
in macroeconomic wage setting from the existence of unemployment. One exam-
ple for this prima facie reasoning is Berthold and Fehn, who have claimed that
“by now it is evident that the wage bargaining system in Germany is almost as
different from a free market situation as one can imagine.“27 In the following, we
will investigate whether this kind of reasoning can be supported by evidence. The
starting point is the well-known Phillips-curve relationship that relates nominal
wage increases positively to increases in prices and productivity and negatively
to the labour market slack, as measured by the rate of unemployment. In turn,
price increases depend positively on wage increases and negatively on producti-
vity increases and on the product market slack:
                                                
26 In 1996, it remained as high as 42 billion D-mark, and the data for 1997 suggest a similar le-
vel. The OECD outflow data are not yet available.
27 Berthold and Fehn (1996), pp. 589.– 21 –
Dwt = a0 + a1Dpt + a2Dqt + a3Ut + a4Dwedget (1)
Dpt = b0 + b1Dwt + b2Dqt + b3At + b4Dpimt (2)
where
w gross labour compensation per hour (in logs)
p GDP deflator (in logs)
q hourly labour productivity (in logs)
U unemployment rate, national definition
Graph 8 Foreign direct investment in Germany, 1984-95
(18 OECD economies only1, in billion D-mark)























1) Approximately 95 per cent of the stock of FDI in Germany is owned by residents of this coun-
try group. Data for earlier years are missing for some smaller countries, most notably for Swit-
zerland 1984-92. The FDI net balance was calculated with data on total outflows (German bal-
ance of payments statistics). The above shown FDI net balance therefore overstates the true net
outflow. Recent data on FDI outflows based on OECD statistics have not been provided. How-
ever, Jost (1997), p. 7, shows that the discrepancy on the outflow side is much smaller. Sources:
Deutsche Bundesbank (1997), pp. 64, 71, partly based on OECD,  Foreign Direct Investment
Statistics; authors’ calculations.– 22 –
wedge difference between gross labour compensation and net take-home
pay per hour28 (in logs)
A rate of capacity utilisation
pim import prices (in logs)
D first difference (growth rate for variables in logs)
The underlying theory is provided by the imperfect competition model29 where
on the labour market unions bargain with firms over nominal wage increases
while on the product market firms have sufficient market power to set the price
as a mark-up over marginal cost. In principle, unions have an incentive to de-
mand higher wages while firms aim at higher prices. With given money supply,
there is a rate of unemployment that equilibrates the desired mark-up over wages
of prices by unions (the real wage) with the desired mark-up of prices over wages
by firms (the unit profit). In the short run, with a given capital stock, this model
provides a basic specification of the macroeconomic supply-side of an economy.
The above model also includes the wedge between gross labour compensation
and net take-home pay in the wage equation and import prices in the price equa-
tion. The wedge variable takes into account that only the income available for
consumption matters for the welfare of the representative union member. Hence,
unions have an incentive to demand higher gross wages in face of increasing
taxes and social security contributions. However, this does not imply that unions
succeed. A coefficient of one of the wedge variable would indicate that unions
are able to shift the tax burden in full onto the employers,30 a coefficient of zero
would imply that workers have to bear the entire taxes incidence. The import
price variable takes into account that during the 1970s and 1980s, price shocks
from imported raw materials had a profound influence on the rate of inflation.
We can also test for hysteresis and persistence in aggregate wage setting, if we
include the change of the unemployment rate in the wage equation.31 Replacing
                                                
28 Layard, Nickell, and Jackman (1991), among others, have used the log difference between the
real product wage and the real consumption wage. However, the use of an additional price
variable would create a problem of exogenous right-hand-side variables.
29 Blanchard (1986), Layard, Nickell, and Jackman (1991), Lindbeck (1993), Franz (1996b).
30 Note that the variables have been expressed in logs; this allows to interpret the estimated coef-
ficients as elasticities.
31 See Hansen (1991), Franz and Gordon (1993), Fitzenberger (1995), and Franz (1996b), pp. 33.– 23 –
Ut by [Ut - Ut
*], that is the deviation of the actual unemployment rate from the
structural unemployment rate (Ut
*), (1) becomes
Dwt = a0 + a1Dpt + a2Dqt + a3 [Ut - Ut*] + a4Dwedge (3)
If Ut* does not only dependent on the structural characteristics of the labour
market (Zt) but also on the unemployment rate of the previous year,
Ut*= g1 Zt + g2Ut-1, (4)
we obtain
Dwt = a’0 + a1Dpt + a2Dqt + a3(1- g2)Ut + a3g2 DUt + a4Dwedge (5)
with  a’0 = a0 - a3g1Zt
Three cases can be distinguished: (i) Only changes of the unemployment rate
are significant (g2 = 1). In this case, ‘insiders’ (job holders) negotiate wages that
are just high enough to guarantee their own employment, while disregarding un-
employment among outsiders.32 This would imply full hysteresis. (ii) Both cur-
rent changes and past levels affect wage growth; hence we have persistence in
wage bargaining (0 < g2 < 1). (iii) Only the level of the unemployment rate has a
significant effect on wage growth (g2 = 0). Wages would then be determined ac-
cording to the pure Phillips curve model. Any deviation of the present rate of
inflation from the structural unemployment rate would merely result from a slug-
gish adjustment of prices and nominal wages to exogenous shocks (nominal rigi-
dities), compared to a full or partial ‘ratchet effect’ that emerges if real wages are
downwardly inflexible (real rigidities).
In order to account for the strong interdependence between wage and price de-
termination, we have estimated the wage equation and the price equation simulta-
neously. We have chosen a model of error correction that allows us to distinguish
between short-run changes in the variables and, in brackets, an adjustment to
                                                
32 Note that increasing unemployment in the present period implies job losses of insiders. This
restrains their wage demand. However, the stock of unemployment does not affect wage set-
ting, if cost of labour turn-over, social norms and harassment prevent unemployed outsiders to
underbid the wages of the incumbent insiders; see Lindbeck (1993), pp. 37-47, and, in more
detail, Lindbeck and Snower (1988).– 24 –
long-run levels.33 If the long-run coefficient of prices in the wage equation is not
significantly different from one, the system will adjust, other variables held con-
stant, to a fixed real wage. If the long-run coefficient of productivity is not signi-
ficantly different from one, the wage share will be constant in the long run. The
error correction term therefore reflects deviations of the wage share and the
wedge from their equilibrium level.
Dwt = a0 + a1Dpt + a2Dqt + a3Ut-1 + a4 DUt-1 + a5Dwedge
- lw[wt-1 - a11pt-1 - a12qt-1 - a13wedge t-1] (6)
Dpt = b0 + b1Dwt + b2Dqt + b3At + b4Dpimt
- l p[pt-1 - b11wt-1 - b12qt-1] (7)
Both equations have been estimated as a linear equation34 with annual data35,
covering the period from 1970 to 1997. Because wage negotiations in Germany
usually take place at the beginning of the year, we have lagged both the level and
the rate of change of the unemployment rate. Several tests on parameter stability
indicate a structural break in the wage equation around 1992.36 Because the last
five years are much too short to allow for a separate regression, we have re-esti-
mated the system for the sub-period from 1980 to 1997. The results of both re-
gressions are consistent with the model (table 1). All coefficients have either the
theoretically expected signs and are significantly different from zero, or they are
                                                
33 The model is based on a modified version of Franz and Gordon (1993); we have included those
variables in the error correction term that are co-integrated, as indicated by the Johansen test.
34 Judged by the adjusted R2, the SER and the SSR, there is not sufficient evidence for a non-
linear relationship between the rate of wage growth and the rate of unemployment.
35 Regressions with quarterly data are plagued by an unstable seasonal pattern and time-varying
lags between wage settlements and their implementation
36  A formal Chow-test using the SSR of two sub-samples or a CUSUM test could not be applied
because the appropriate sub-samples do not contain sufficient data to estimate the whole sys-
tem simultaneously. Instead, we analysed the residuals of each equation separately, ignoring the
interdependence of wages and prices. The CUSUM test indicates a structural break in the wage
equation in 1992, while the price equation appear to be stable over time. Franz and Gordon
(1993) have identified a structural brake in the early 1970s. We therefore started the regression
with 1970. An additional shift parameter in their regression for 1980 and 1990 did not indicate
a structural break in the 1980s. This corresponds to our findings.– 25 –
insignificant where the model allows for this possibility. The most important
results are:
First of all, wages and prices are highly interdependent. Wage settlements ful-
ly incorporate inflation because both the short-run and the long-run coefficient of
prices in the wage equation are not significantly different from one. In turn, pri-
ces are mainly driven by the trend in unit labour costs.37 In the short run, how-
ever, prices are also influenced by the rate of capacity utilisation and by import
prices. The strong feedback from prices to wages suggests a rather high degree of
nominal wage flexibility. A change in the inflation rate will be fully incorporated
in the next round of wage negotiations. For the entire period, the value of the er-
ror correction term is in the wage equation is 0.29. However, for the period from
1980 to 1997, the value of the error correction term triples to 0.74. Disturbances
are by and large corrected after one year.
Second, there is clear evidence for persistence in wage determination for the
entire period. Both the level and the change of the unemployment rate are statisti-
cally significant. Moreover, both variables have the same effect. However, if we
exclude the 1970s, the hysteresis effect vanishes and the coefficient of the unem-
ployment level increases in absolute terms from -0.27 to -0.63. This indicates a
pure Phillips curve relationship with a stronger responsiveness of wage settle-
ments to the level of unemployment. It is not entirely clear whether this result
mainly stems from the impact of the last several years or whether it also holds for
the 1980s. A decade is too short to test this conjecture with annual data. Never-
theless, our results suggest that the well-documented evidence on persistence ef-
fects in wage determination in West Germany38 may have been heavily influenced
by developments of 1970s.
Third, there is evidence for a positive impact of the tax wedge on wages, both
in the short run and in the long run. For the entire period, the long-run coefficient
of the wedge is 0.22. This implies that an increase in the wedge of one percent
increases the wage level by a fifth.39 However, both the value of the short-run and
the long-run coefficient decline in the sub-period from 1980 to 1997. This indi-
                                                
37 In contrast, Franz and Gordon (1993) do not find a statistically significant effect of the lagged
labour share (w-q-p) on the prices. This would imply no feedback from wages to prices.
38 See,  inter alia, Burda (1990), Möller and Völker (1991), Franz and Gordon (1993).– 26 –
cates that unions have succeeded less in shifting the tax incidence. Nevertheless,
even for the sub-period from 1980 to 1997, the elasticity of the tax wedge with
respect to wages is substantial, namely 0.16.
These results have a number of implications for the evaluation of West Ger-
man wage policy since unification. Most importantly, the widespread assessment
of powerful unions in West Germany that fail to moderate their wage claims in
face of disinflation and high unemployment is not supported by econometric evi-
dence. Excluding the 1970s, macroeconomic wage-setting can be characterised
by a pure Phillips curve relationship with relatively low nominal rigidities. This
suggests that wage settlements react fairly quickly to a declining rate of
unemployment (1990-92) as well as to an increasing rate of unemployment
(1993-94, 1996-97). Forecast errors are usually reversed within a year.
Furthermore, the responsiveness of aggregate wage settlements to unemployment
suggests that the unification-induced increase of labour supply from East
Germany through migration and commuting had not an adverse effect on the
equilibrium unemployment rate in West Germany. In turn, the failure of the
unemployment rate to return to the pre-recession level in the 1980s and the 1990s
may better be explained by others factors, for example by a loss of skills among
long-term unemployed and a capital shortage following an extended period of
slow growth.
Since unification, the rate of taxes and social security contributions on labour
income has risen by some 17 per cent. An ex-post simulation with our model
shows that the sharp increase in the tax wedge since 1991 drove up the long-run
real wage by some 3 per cent. If we take a standard estimate of the wage elastici-
ty of labour demand of 0.3, this would imply a decline in the level of employ-
ment from 1991 to 1997 by approximately 0.9 per cent. However, this estimate
does not take macroeconomic repercussion effects into account; it can therefore
be regarded as only tentative. Nevertheless, the decision of the German govern-
                                                
39  Tullio, Steinherr and Buscher (1996) estimate for 1977-90 coefficients ranging from 0.19 to 0.26.– 27 –
ment to finance a large part of the transfers to the East via higher taxes on labour
appears to have contributed to the rise in unemployment.40
                                                
40 Note that each tax drives a wedge between the gross wage and the net wage, c.f. Lindbeck
(1993), pp. 88-91. However, taxes on labour alone drive a greater wedge because the tax base
is smaller than, say, income or consumption expenditures.– 28 –








Dq  0.33 (5.1) 0.41 (5.5)
Ut-1 -0.27 (4.3) -0.63 (7.6)
DU t-1 -0.29 (3.3) 0.08 (0.4)
Dwedge  0.15 (6.5) 0.08 (3.3)




q t-1  0.29 (2.1) 0.40 (6.8)
Wedge t-1  0.22 (3.8) 0.16 (5.6)
Adjusted R
2 0.98  0.93
SER  0.00515  0.00413
Durbin-Watson 2.11 2.07
SSR  0.00053  0.00017
Price equation
Constant  0.51 (4.0) 0.51 (2.6)
Dw  0.48 (16.5) 0.52 (5.4)
Dq -0.50 (4.1) -0.23 (3.0)
A2)  0.08 (2.4) 0.35 (0.8)
Dpim  0.02 (2.5) 0.02 (0.2)
Error correction term  0.10 (3.9) 0.10 (2.5)





SER 0.0051  0.00507
Durbin-Watson 2.03 1.70
SSR 0.000454 0.00031
All variables except U and A are in logs. D denotes differences. t-statistics in brackets. Estimation
method: Iterative Three-Stage Least Squares. Instruments: a0, b0, Dq, q(-1), DU(-1), U(-1), Dwedge,
wedge(-1), w(-1), p(-1), A, Dpim, pim(-1). *) Restricted to 1; the unrestricted value of the coeffi-
cient is not significantly different from 1; the Wald test suggests that the restriction improves the
efficiency of the estimate. 1) Not identical to a’0 in equation (5) because different dimensions in the
variables of the error correction term influence the estimated constant. 2) Deviation from the mean
rate of capacity utilisation 1970-97, normalised around 0. 3) Prices minus wages and productivity.
Sources: DIW, Vierteljährliche volkswirtschaftliche Gesamtrechnung; authors’ calculations.– 29 –
4 Supply-side problems? Microeconomics
Contrary to the 1970s and the early 1980s, deteriorating macroeconomic supply-
side conditions and real wage rigidities cannot provide a plausible account for the
slump in investment and huge increase in unemployment. This suggests that mi-
croeconomic rigidities may be the key problem. The most important evidence
comes from a comparison to the U.S., where the unfettered forces of competition
seem to have laid the foundations for a sustained expansion of employment since
the early 1990s. This is at least what many observers have stressed. While it
would go far beyond the scope of this paper to address the relationship between
microeconomic flexibility and employment growth in detail, we will briefly deal
with two problems that feature prominently in the recent literature: First, to what
extent can microeconomic labour market rigidities provide a convincing expla-
nation of West Germany’s labour market slump (4.1)? Second, are product mar-
ket regulations in the service sector a major constraint on a sustained increase in
employment (4.2)?
4.1 Labour market rigidities
Starting with the work of Phelps (1967) and Friedman (1968), a large part of the
literature relies on a decomposition of the unemployment rate into a structural
and a cyclical component.41 The structural component, initially called ‘natural’, is
considered to be exclusively determined by the characteristics of the labour mar-
ket. This approach is closely linked to the Phillips-curve model discussed above.
The structural rate of unemployment can be interpreted as the rate of unemploy-
ment where the rate of inflation is stable (NAIRU). Any attempt to lower the ac-
tual rate of unemployment permanently below the NAIRU through expansionary
monetary policies will inevitably lead to a permanently higher rate of inflation,
but not to less unemployment. Main determinants of the NAIRU are considered
to be: job search activity; unemployment benefits that raise the reservation wage
of job-seekers; shifts in the bargaining power of unions or employers’ associa-
tions; wage structures that are not sufficiently flexible with respect to sectoral,
regional and skill-specific labour market disequilibria; and employment protec-
                                                
41  For an influential argument in the ‘natural rate’ tradition, see OECD (1994, 1997a).– 30 –
tion, restrictions on hours worked and social security contributions that make
labour more expensive.
The most analytically puzzling development of the 1980s was an increase in
the estimated NAIRU in Germany, as in most other European countries, that
could no longer be traced to a change in the structural characteristics of the la-
bour markets.42 The analytically even more puzzling development of the 1990s
was a strong increase in West Germany’s unemployment rate that went hand in
hand with decreasing labour market rigidity, in particular since 1995.43 Recent re-
form measures of the government and of the collective bargaining parties have
been adopted in a piecemeal fashion, and many economists believe that the rate
of reform is much too low, given the dramatic deterioration of labour market per-
formance. From the perspective of the ‘natural rate’ theory, it is nevertheless dif-
ficult to understand why unemployment continues to rise.44
However, the rate of unemployment might even rise without a change in la-
bour market rigidities, if the nature and direction of structural change necessi-
tates more flexibility. Since the late 1970s, the wage-premium of skilled workers
has substantially increased in the U.S. and in the U.K. while the wage level of
less-skilled workers has declined in relative and partly even in absolute terms. A
rapidly growing body of literature has identified two largely complementary fac-
tors behind this development: skill-biased technological change (SBTC), in par-
ticular the spread of computers, and increasing trade with newly developing
countries.45 In continental Europe, particularly in countries such as Germany,
wage structures have remained fairly rigid. Hence, SBTC and international trade
are likely to have caused a fall in the demand for unskilled labour. This, in turn,
may be a major force behind the rise in Europe’s unemployment rate.
                                                
42 For example, the OECD Jobs Study (1994), Vol. I, p. 67, reports: „Despite considerable
effort, it has been hard to identify changes in the basic structural determinants of the natural
unemployment rate that are large enough to account for the observed trend increase in the
actual rate during the 1980s.“ See also Scarpetta (1996), pp. 65-70.
43 For a survey of recent measures, see OECD (1997d), pp. 118-139.
44 An alternative explanation would refer to the interaction of macroeconomic shocks and la-
bour market structures, leading to ‘hysteresis effects‘ in the unemployment rate, see, inter
alia, Blanchard and Summers (1986) and Lindbeck (1993). However, our econometric
estimate in part 3.3 does not lend support to this view.– 31 –
A second variant of the structural theory of unemployment that has been de-
veloped for Germany46 relates rising unemployment to de-industrialisation. De-
industrialisation occurs mainly in recessions, such as those following both oil-
price shocks. Due to a lower capital intensity, the service sector offers only rela-
tively low wages for less-skilled workers while generous unemployment benefits
keep the reservation wage of dismissed manufacturing workers high. Skill-
upgrading is difficult because most dismissed production workers are older and
shaped by the experience of decades of manual work. Hence, unemployed wor-
kers would often rather queue at the factory gates than accept massive income
losses and possibly also social degradation in the service sector. As extended job-
lessness frustrates search intensity and because employers use unemployment
duration as a negative screening device, a steadily-growing pool of long-term
unemployed production workers emerges. Passive labour market policies and
rigid wage structures in the service sector prevent long-term unemployed persons
from taking any new job later on that would sustain them.
What does the evidence suggest for Germany? The Council of Economic Ex-
perts has estimated for the early 1990s that mismatch may account for a fifth of
West Germany’s overall rate of unemployment.47 Entorf (1995, 1996) has applied
a new measure for labour market mismatch that shows a sharply declining mat-
ching efficiency during the 1970s, and a further, but moderate deterioration until
the early 1990s. Both studies give no indication as to the importance of skill-spe-
cific mismatch. In support of the de-industrialisation hypothesis, it has been
pointed out that the rate of long-term unemployment among blue-collar workers
has increased from close to zero in the early 1970s to as high as 3.8 per cent in
the late 1980s, that most of the mobility between occupations and sectors occurs
between generations rather than within the same generation, and that the unem-
ployment rate for less-skilled workers is substantially higher than that for skilled
workers (table 2, panel A).48
                                                
45 See,  inter alia, Wood (1994), and Berman, Bound, and Machin (1997); for surveys of the
literature, see Lawrence (1996) and Lindlar and Trabold (1998).
46 Klodt and Stehn (1995), pp. 200-247, Klodt, Maurer, Schimmelpfennig (1997), pp. 135-209.
47 Sachverständigenrat (1994), p. 254.
48 See footnote 46.– 32 –
Fitzenberger and Franz (1997) have estimated that an equalisation of skill-
specific unemployment rates in West Germany would require, other variables
constant, an increase in the wage spread between the median wage of less-skilled
workers and that of medium-skilled workers of 15 per cent and an increase in the
wage spread between the median wage of less-skilled workers and that of highly-
skilled workers of 45 per cent. However, an equalisation of the unemployment
rates between different skill groups implies a falling demand for skilled workers
and an increasing demand for less-skilled workers. This does not necessarily im-
ply that the overall unemployment rate will decline. Moreover, the evidence
shows that unskilled workers have generally higher unemployment rates, even in
the U.S.49 This is because unskilled workers generally have higher job turnover
rates, and their job turnover is more frequently interrupted by an extended period
                                                
49 Layard, Nickell, and Jackman (1991), chapter 6; Nickell/Bell (1997).
Table 2 Skill-specific unemployment rates1 in West Germany, 1975-1996
(in per cent)






Total 3.5 6.4 7.2 7.0 71 100,0
Less-skilled
2 5.5 11.4 15.3 16.7 68 46,7
Occupational Education
3 2.6 4.7 5.2 5.2 79 42,5
Occupational Schools
4 1.6 2.4 2.5 2.4 66 5,1
College
5 2.5 3.4 3.4 3.1 57 1,8
University
6 1.6 3.5 4.4 3.8 37 3,9
B. Relative unemployment rates (university = 1.0)
Less-skilled
2 3.6 3.3 3.5 4.4 .. ..
Occupational Education
3 1.7 1.4 1.2 1.4 .. ..
Occupational Schools
4 1.0 0.7 0.6 0.6 .. ..
College
5 1.6 1.0 0.8 0.8 .. ..
University
6 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 .. ..
1) Officially registered unemployed as per cent of the civil labour force with the respective skill
level, excluding apprenticeships. The original specifications by skill-level are: 2) Ohne abge-
schlossene Berufsausbildung. 3) Betriebliche Berufsausbildung. 4) Berufsfach-/Fachschule. 5)
Fachhochschule. 6) Universität. a) Percentage increase in the absolute number of unemployed by
skill-category. Sources: Reinberg (1997), appendix 1, Bundesanstalt für Arbeit (1997), pp. 7; au-
thors’ calculations.– 33 –
of unemployment. Hence, equal unemployment rates across skill levels might not
be a useful reference point.
Another problem is that macroeconomic developments may also affect the
change of skill-specific unemployment rates over time. In order to control for
macro-effects, relative unemployment rates among different skill-groups provide
more meaningful information. The evidence shows that since the late 1970s, the
rate of long-term unemployed blue-collar workers relative to that of white-collar
workers has only moderately increased.50 This suggests that the de-industrialisa-
tion hypothesis may only account for a rather small part of the overall increase of
unemployment. Similarly, the rate of unemployment of less-skilled workers rela-
tive to those of highly-skilled workers shows also no large upward trend since the
late 1970s (table 2, panel B), indicating an only moderate increase in mismatch.
Interestingly, this number has risen by a similar magnitude in the U.S.51 How-
ever, the picture looks more favourable for the mismatch-hypothesis if the unem-
ployment rate among less-skilled workers is compared to that of medium-skilled
workers; the ratio rose from 2.1 to 3.1 (table 2, panel B).
The data show that since 1991, unemployment in all skill categories has in-
creased dramatically (table 2, column 5). Unemployment of less-skilled workers
has largely risen in line with overall unemployment. The largest increase in un-
employment has occurred among workers with an occupational education, while
unemployment among workers with a university degree increased below average.
The lower increase of unemployment among the latter group also suggests that
mismatch unemployment has increased, but the share of this group in total unem-
ployment appears to be too small to suggest a large effect. Overall, table 2 is not
inconsistent with the view that aggregate developments have dominated structu-
ral trends. Indeed, if rigid wage structures were among the key constraints to em-
ployment generation, highly-skilled labour would be heavily underpriced. In the
last several years, this should have led to a substantial decline the level of un-
employment among highly-skilled workers. Yet, their level of unemployment
continues to be much higher than before the recession.
                                                
50 From 1.8 (1974-79) to 2.4 (1987-92); Klodt and Stehn (1995), table 45, authors’ calculation.
51 Nickell/Bell (1997), table 10.2, report an increase in the relative unemployment rate of low-
skilled vs. high-skilled workers from 3.9 per cent in 1975-78 to 4.5 per cent in 1987-91.– 34 –
4.2 Product market regulations
Another line of argument suggests that employment generation in continental Eu-
rope may be seriously constrained by product market regulations and by high mi-
nimum wages in the service sector. This argument has been advanced most pro-
minently by the McKinsey Global Institute which has issued a series of policy
studies on this subject.52 The comparison to the U.S. has been found to be par-
ticularly revealing. The McKinsey Global Institute (1997) has estimated that
since 1970, the U.S. economy has increased labour input in the non-manufactu-
ring market sector from 200 to 280 employed persons per 1000 capita, while in
the West German economy it declined from 190 to 160 employed persons.53 The
McKinsey study shows that labour productivity in many West German service in-
dustries is substantially lower than in the U.S. and suggests that higher produc-
tivity frequently goes hand in hand with higher employment. The McKinsey stu-
dy identifies industry-specific product market regulations and high wages for
low-skilled workers as the main barriers to higher output and more employment
in the German economy.
One year before McKinsey completed its study on Germany’s presumed serv-
ice-sector gap, the German Institute for Economic Research (DIW) argued in a
widely-discussed article that Germany’s presumed gap in services is largely an
effect of the official sectoral-structure statistics that disguise the true importance
of service jobs for the economy (table 3).54 Based on a classification according to
job activity instead of sector and on a more complete coverage of actual employ-
ment, household panel data reveal that Western Germany has largely closed the
service gap to the U.S. According to those data, both countries employed three
quarters of the workforce in service activities in 1993. The main difference be-
tween sector and occupation statistics is explained by the greater use of service
activities within German industry and the greater use of industry activities within
the U.S. service sector. One major reason for this pattern is the fact that German
manufacturing has to a far smaller extent out-sourced service activities. Another
                                                
52 See in particular and most recently McKinsey (1997); for a similar arguments, see inter alia
Grömling and Lichtblau (1997).
53 McKinsey measures employed persons in full-time equivalents. Services exclude the public
sector and social services.
54 These results were confirmed by Klodt, Maurer, and Schimmmelpfennig (1997).– 35 –
important reason is the insufficient coverage of employment below the social se-
curity threshold wage in official German statistics. A fuller coverage of this kind
of employment is estimated to add 7 per cent to recorded employment in West
Germany, leading to a substantially higher level of employment in industries
such as distributive services.55 Nevertheless, even if service activities are
measured by job activity, West Germany’s service employment per capita is
lower than in the U.S. However, this is entirely due to macroeconomic factors,
namely a higher employment rate in the U.S.56
In general, the empirical literature suggests that deregulation and privatisation
can improve productivity and consumer welfare considerably, while employment
may increase or decline, depending on the elasticity of the product demand with
respect to price and quality.57 From a macroeconomic perspective, deregulation
may improve the level of employment through declining mark-ups of firms,
through a positive link between service-sector regulations and labour intensity
and through the impact of lower prices on aggregate demand.58 Because West
Germany appears to have rather substantial productivity gaps in a number of ser-
vice industries,59 deregulation promises substantial gains in productivity and con-
sumer welfare. With respect to employment gains, the available evidence is
scant. The coincidence of rising unemployment and significant advances in priva-
tisation and deregulation – the partial privatisation of the national railway, the
national telecommunication agency, the Federal postal service, more liberal shop
opening hours and, of course, the complete dismantling of the communist econo-
mic system in the East – makes it difficult to disentangle the effects of more pro-
duct market competition from other influences on the level of employment.
                                                
55 Schupp, Schwarze, and Wagner (1997), Haisken-De New, Horn, Schupp, and Wagner (1997).
56 Note that service employment (SE) per capita (N) can be decomposed into SE/N = SE/E ×
E/WN × WN/N, where E is total employment and WN is the working age population.
57 Winston (1993), Hoj, Kato, and Pilat (1995).
58 For a survey, see van Bergeijk and Haffner (1996), Gersbach and Sheldon (1996).
59  Pilat (1996) and Ark, Monnikhof and Mulder (1998).– 36 –
Overall, our evidence on microeconomic supply-side problems is less conclu-
sive. On the one hand, we have presented evidence against some simplified and
influential arguments; on the other hand, there are huge gaps in empirical re-
search, in particular for the last several years. If we take the evidence of this and
the last chapter together, we would instead suggest that structural unemployment
in West Germany has not increased much since the late 1980s, at least not inde-
pendently of macroeconomic developments. However, this assessment is clearly
influenced by our analysis of demand-side problems, to which we turn now.
5 Demand-side problems
Since unification, the West German economy has been exposed to an unusually
large number of positive and negative demand shocks that destabilised the econ-
omy and that led to considerably lower growth, compared to the second half of
the 1980s (graph 9). The main force behind the destabilisation of the German
economy was fiscal policy that first overheated the economy through massive de-
ficits during the early 1990s and later on switched to a pro-cyclical budget conso-
lidation. The overheating of the economy led to a substantial surge in wage sett-
lements; it invited monetary policy to become extremely tight. This in turn was
the main reason for the extraordinarily severe recession in 1992/93. The restric-
Table 3 Structure of employment according to sector and to job activity in
West Germany and in the U.S., 1993
(in per cent of total employment)
Classification according to Job structure by sector
sector employed job activity agriculture industry services
West Germany
Agriculture 2.1 1.8 83.5 0.1 0.2
Industry1 38.6 25.4 0.5 56.6 4.7
Services2 59.3 72.8 16.0 43.3 95.1
U.S.
Agriculture 4.2 2.5 47.0 0.5 0.7
Industry1 23.7 25.9 4.0 62.5 15.0
Services2 72.2 71.6 49.0 37.0 84.3
1  Including construction. – 2 Including the public sector. Sources: Haisken-De New, Horn,
Schupp, and Wagner (1996), based on data of the German Socio-economic Panel (GSOEP) and
the U.S. Census of Private Households.– 37 –
tive monetary policy also contributed to the EMS crisis and the overshooting ap-
preciation of the D-mark between 1992 and 1995. We first give an account of
how the slump unfolded (5.1), followed by an investigation into possible alterna-
tives to the macroeconomic policies adopted since unification (5.2).
5.1 The unfolding of the slump
To illustrate the unfolding of the slump, we have divided the period under con-
sideration into four different periods. Each of them was characterised by specific
shocks, namely the overheating of the economy through extremely expansionary
fiscal policy (1990-91), the consequences of sharp monetary restraint (1992-93),
fiscal restraint, too-high wage settlements and currency overvaluation (1994-95),
and finally, continued fiscal restraint, sharp wage restraint and depressed consu-
mer demand (1996-97).60
Stage 1: Overheating of the economy, 1990-91
Already in 1990, the West German economy experienced a further acceleration of
growth. High growth was fuelled mainly by a reform in income taxation that be-
came effective at the beginning of 1990. The tax reform led to a decline in the
private sector tax burden of 33 billion D-mark in 1990. On top of that came the
additional demand from East Germany which soared from 18 billion DM in 1989
to 220 billion DM in 1992.61 This demand push was largely financed by public
transfers of well over 200 billion per annum, that is, 7 per cent of West Ger-
many’s GDP. In reaction to unification, long-term interest rates rose by 2 per
cent in nominal terms and by one per cent in real terms. Initially, however, the
increase in capital costs was overcompensated by the massive demand pulse from
fiscal expenditures. Moreover, in 1990, the West German economy was in its se-
venth year of sustained prosperity, and many investors held the belief that the bu-
siness cycle was more or less a thing of the past. Firms reacted to the additional
demand impulse from unification with a marked expansion of capacities and em-
ployment (graph 2 above).
                                                
60 For more details, see DIW (1990-98).
61 Scheremet and Zwiener (1996).– 38 –
During the peak of expansion, employment increased on an annual basis by al-
most 3 per cent per quarter. The unemployment rate declined to 4 per cent and
labour became increasingly scarce. Wage settlements reacted with nominal in-
creases of 6 per cent in 1990 and 1991, compared to 4 per cent during the late
1980s. Due to the relatively high degree of openness, firms were only partly able
to shift the higher cost pressure onto prices. The excess demand was to a large
extent satisfied by production capacities from abroad, in particular from the rest
of Western Europe.
For the government, it became increasingly apparent that unification could not
be financed solely by additional growth, as it was initially planned. Consequent-
ly, the government decided on a number of tax increases and expenditure cuts.
However, those measures fell far short of compensating the 1990 tax reform’s
reduction of the tax burden. The entire expansionary fiscal impulse was 72 bil-
lion D-marks in 1991 and 30 billion D-marks in 1992 (table 4). This huge fiscal
impulse contributed directly to 40 per cent of the output increase in 1991. Due to
Graph 9 Output and employment in West Germany, 1970-97
(annual average growth rates, quarterly data, in per cent)





















Seasonally adjusted data, GDP at constant prices; employment refers to the total number of per-
sons employed. The years refer to the first quarter. Sources: DIW, Vierteljährliche volkswirt-
schaftliche Gesamtrechnung; authors’ calculations.– 39 –
the transition crisis in the East, it were mainly West German producers who
benefited from the additional demand.
Stage 2: The consequences of monetary restraint set in, 1992-93
Initially, the overheating of the economy led less to an acceleration of inflation
than to an increasing deficit in the current account. However, from the middle of
the year 1991 onwards, the government started to increase indirect taxes, social
security rates and administrative fees in order to control for the rising deficit.
Consequently, the rate of inflation soared, albeit temporarily, to 4 per cent. The
Bundesbank viewed this development as a serious threat to price stability. The
Bundesbank was already concerned about the substantial increase in money sup-
ply in the wake of unification. Enlarged money supply (M3), which includes cre-
dits and savings deposits, increased through the currency union by 15 per cent,
which was substantially higher than the increase in potential production. Accor-
Table 4 Demand Impulses
1 of the Public Sector, 1990-97
(+ positive impulse, - negative impulse, in billion DM)
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Total Expenditure -2 132 48 -49 -33 18 -75 -43
Public Consumption -4 37 5 -24 -4 1 -11 -21
Gross Investment -1 10 5 -6 -4 -7 -10 -7
Interest Payments -2 4 14 -11 0 23 -4 -1
Transfers
3 58 22 5- 8 - 2 5 1 - 5 0 - 1 4
Total revenues 27 -57 -5 44 22 -1 59 35
Taxes 28 -20 3 33 -4 6 52 35
Social Security 1 -34 1 5 -19633
Other Revenues
2 -2 -2 -9 6 2 -1 10 2
Financial Balance
3 25 76 44 -4 -55 18 17 -9
Demand Impulse
4 27 72 30 6 -55 -5 -12 -8
Change in GDP
5 168 186 224 88 165 130 83 103
1)  Deviations of the actual level from the trend level, as extrapolated from the level of the pre-
vious year by potential production at current prices. If government revenues or spending remain
constant as a share of potential output, fiscal policy is neutral to aggregate demand. Both discre-
tionary and cyclical changes in the budget are treated as relevant to demand. – 2) Excluding net-
revenues by the Bundesbank. – 3) Excluding transfers to the rest of the world. – 4) Excluding in-
terest payments. 5) At current prices. Source: DIW (1998), DIW, Vierteljährliche volkswirt-
schaftliche Gesamtrechnung; authors’ calculations.– 40 –
ding to the Bundesbank, this implied higher inflation. From the outset, its efforts
were aimed at correcting the presumed monetary overhang. Moreover, the Bun-
desbank predicted an overheating of the economy through fiscal deficits. Conse-
quently, the Bundesbank raised short-term interest rates substantially above long-
term rates (graph 10).62 Even in 1992, when the consequences of monetary re-
striction became apparent and long-run interest rates were in decline, the Bun-
desbank continued to increase the discount rate. Now, the main concern was with
the very high wage settlements of 6 per cent in nominal terms. This wage settle-
ment partly reflected the unwillingness of unions to bear the burden of the unifi-
cation-induced increase in social security contributions. The monetary restraint
was magnified by a real appreciation of the D-mark of nearly 10 per cent (graph
11), following the EMS-crisis in late 1992. As the positive fiscal impulse petered
out, the monetary restraint became dominant and West Germany slumped into a
recession. The recession was the deepest in postwar history.
Stage 3: Fiscal restraint and overvaluation of the D-mark, 1994-95
Wage policy reacted to the recession and to the rise in unemployment with pro-
nounced restraint in 1993 and 1994. Because of inertia in price-setting (table 1,
above), the rate of inflation declined with a lag. Moreover, the consumer price
index, the Bundesbank’s key indicator for inflationary pressure, was heavily in-
fluenced by an increase in indirect taxes and administrated prices. Despite a
much lower increase in unit labour costs, the Bundesbank was reluctant to lower
interest rates.63 In contrast to the U.S. where monetary restriction before the last
recession by the Fed was only short-lived, the yield curve remained inverse for
about four years (graph 10). Moreover, the return of the yield curve to normality
in 1994 was less a result of lower short-term interest rates than of higher long-
term interest rates. This rise in the long-term interest rate was heavily influenced
by the Federal Reserve which reacted to a presumed overheating of the U.S.
                                                
62 The literature has shown that the term-structure of interest rates in a good predictor of re-
cessions; see, inter alia, Estrella and Mishkin (1997), Smets and Tsatsaronis (1997).
63 Horn (1998) shows that the U.S. Federal Reserve also uses labour market indicators, in par-
ticular unit labour costs, as indicator for monetary policy, while the Bundesbank relies most-
ly on the current rate of inflation. Because prices are relatively rigid in the short-run, Ger-
man monetary policy tends to react too late.– 41 –
economy with monetary restraint. Hence, Germany, as well as Europe as a whole,
was already confronted with rising cost of capital in an early phase of the up-
swing.
However, this apparently inflexible monetary policy followed its own logic.
Traditionally, the Bundesbank views the powerful actors in Germany’s political
economy, in particular generous finance ministers and ambitious unions leaders,
to be a major potential threat to price stability. Once these actors have broken the
rules of the game and inflation accelerates, the Bundesbank not only has to regain
control; it also has to re-build its anti-inflationary reputation. This implies that a
sharp monetary restriction is usually followed by a gradual relaxation. This asym-
metrical monetary strategy clearly fails to provide investors with much confi-
dence during the upswing.64
                                                
64 See,  inter alia, Carlin and Soskice (1997), p. 68-70.
Graph 10 Monetary policy compared, 1980-97: The yield curve
(difference between the long-term and the short-term interest rate)











Semi-annual data, the years refer to the first half of the year. Partly estimates for 1997. Sources:
OECD, Economic Outlook Database (November 1997); authors’ calculations.– 42 –
In the face of the rising deficit, the government opted for a sharp budget con-
solidation (table 4). In 1993, in the midst of Germany’s worst postwar recession,
many public expenditures were drastically cut. Nevertheless, the overall fiscal
stance was slightly anti-cyclical because of automatic stabilisers. In 1994, fiscal
policy became fully restrictive, because taxes rates continued to increase while
transfers were cut. In the early recovery phase, the private sector was therefore
confronted with an adverse demand shock of 55 billion D-marks which was, in
absolute terms, a third as high as the overall increase in nominal GDP. The con-
tinuation of the moderate business cycle upswing despite higher long-term inter-
est rates and fiscal contraction owed much to wage restraint and to the upswing
in exports. Most business cycle indicators and forecasts even suggested an accel-
eration of growth.
Graph 11 Real effective exchange rate of the D-mark1, 1980-19972
(average of 1981.1-1992.1 = 0; deviation in per cent3)








1) A real effective exchange rate (REER) is an index of a nominal exchange rate at constant do-
mestic prices relative to a weighted index of the same indictor for the major trading partners.
Based on consumer prices and export market shares as weights. 2) Semi-annual data, the years
refer to the first half of the year. Partly estimates for 1997. 3) The main problem with REER is the
arbitrary choice of the base year. However, except for the unit labour cost in manufacturing, the in-
dices of REER for Germany are stationary for 1981.1-1992.1. If on average purchasing power par-
ity holds for this period, the equilibrium exchange rate is equal to the average level. Sources:
OECD, Economic Outlook Database (November 1997), updated for 1997.2 with Bundesbank
data; authors’ calculations.– 43 –
In this rather favourable climate of early 1995, a new round of collective wage
bargaining took place. In contrast to earlier years, it was characterised by sharp
confrontation. In the metal industry, the employers’ association offered no wage
increase at all. Rather, the employers demanded wage cuts of 10 per cent. This
unprecedented hard-line strategy can only be understood from the background of
the ongoing ‘competitiveness debate’. However, a strategy of confrontation was
not supported by the majority of the members in the Federal Association of Em-
ployers. Those firms that operated on the international market experienced a ra-
pid recovery of their export sales (graph 12, below) and a corresponding im-
provement in profits. In reaction to the extreme demands of the employers in the
metal-working industry, unions opted for a hard line as well. The unions’ strategy
was not a call for an extensive strike but to select a prospering regional industry
where they could expect the least resistance. As the strikebound firms feared
losing market shares, they were interested in a swift conflict settlement rather
than in an extended and costly industrial conflict. Hence, unions were able to
achieve, partly to their own surprise, a nominal wage increase of more than 5 per
cent. This excessive wage settlement set the pace for the rest of the economy. At
the same time, the Exchange Rate Mechanism of the EMS came under pressure
again. In spring of 1995, accumulated inflation differentials led into an overshoo-
ting real appreciation of the D-mark of another 7 per cent (graph 11, above).
Within a short period of time, investors’ expectations were severely disap-
pointed twice. In the early 1990s, firms expanded production capacities in expec-
tation of a rapid and steady expansion in unified Germany. The 1992/93 reces-
sion revealed that firms had built up a capital stock that was substantially over-
sized. The recession was severe but short-lived. As early as 1994, firms started to
regain confidence. Investment demand recovered, although cautiously. However,
as early as 1995, the decision to invest was again proven wrong. This drawback
had a strongly adverse effect on the general business outlook, in particular be-
cause it was widely interpreted as proof that the last recession was not merely a
recession but the onset of a deep structural crisis.
Stage 4: Wage restraint and depressed consumer demand, 1996-97– 44 –
Since 1996, the development of demand was highly dichotomous. While the ex-
port sector recovered rather quickly from the overvaluation peak in 1995, the
producers for the domestic markets faced stagnant or even declining demand. In
late 1997, incoming orders in manufacturing from abroad were nearly 40 per cent
above the level of 1991 (graph 12), while incoming orders from the domestic
market were little above the recession level of 1993, and much less below the
level of 1991. The situation in services looked less bleak, but bleak enough.
In the face of rising unemployment and the mistaken wage policy in 1995, un-
ions reacted with strong wage moderation. In 1996, hourly labour compensation
in West Germany rose in nominal terms by only 2 per cent, in 1997 by only 1.3
per cent, while profits increased by 4.9 per cent and 10 per cent respectively. The
potentially positive effect of low nominal wage increases on the level of employ-
ment appear to have been out-weighted by weak consumer demand and by disin-
flation. In 1996, consumer expenditure rose in real terms by only 1.3 per cent, in
1997 by as little as 0.3 per cent. In contrast, consumer expenditures in the rest of
Graph 12 Incoming orders in German manufacturing, 1991-1997
(monthly data, 1991 = 100)












Three month moving average of seasonally adjusted data. The years refer to March. This indica-
tor is only available for manufacturing. Sources: Statistisches Bundesamt; authors’ calculations.– 45 –
the EU rose on average by 2.2 per cent.65 While in small, highly-open economies
like that of the Netherlands, the negative impact of wage moderation on domestic
consumption can be compensated by a real depreciation of the currency and
therefore by higher export demand. This effect is more limited in large, open
economies like Germany where domestic demand accounts for 80 per cent of to-
tal demand.
This weakness of demand was enhanced by tight fiscal policy aiming to meet
the Maastricht deficit criteria. Monetary policy was, despite deflationary tenden-
cies, not prepared to lower interest rates. Hence the rate of inflation, measured by
the GDP deflator, dropped below one per cent (graph 13). If we take into account
                                                
65 DIW (1998).
Graph 13 Inflation rates in Germany
1, the EU and the U.S., 1984-982
(GDP deflator, in per cent)











Semi-annual data, the years refer to the first half of the year. Partly estimates for 1997. 1) A
Bundesbank report has recently argued that the consumer price index for Germany may overstate
the rate of inflation by at least 0.75 percentage points (Hoffmann 1998). This would imply that
the GDP deflator is presently close to or even below zero. 2) Before 1994, the data for Germany
as a whole are distorted by the adjustment of relative prices in East Germany, following the suc-
cessive liberalisation of formerly state-controlled prices, in particular rent. Estimates for 1998,
excluding for Germany the expected effect of an increase of the VAT in April 1998. Sources,
Germany: DIW, Vierteljährliche volkswirtschaftliche Gesamtrechnung, updated by the spring
forecast of the leading economic research institutes; EU, U.S.: OECD, Economic Outlook Data-
base (November 1997); authors’ calculations.– 46 –
that the officially measured rate of inflation has an approximate upward bias of at
least 0.75 per cent, the German economy is probably on the brink of deflation. In
1998, the measured rate of inflation in Germany will remain substantially below
that of the U.S. and the EU. What is even more striking, however, is the response
of major actors in macroeconomic policy. The ‘annual economic report’ of the
Federal government praises that ‘price stability is not endangered’ and the Bun-
desbank celebrates the near stability of prices as an achievement that has to be
preserved.66
5.2 An interpretation
How does the evidence from part 3.3 and 5.1 fit together? We can illustrate our
explanation with a simple model of the labour market under imperfect competi-
tion (graph 14).67 The LS curve describes labour supply which is assumed to be,
in line with the evidence, fairly inelastic with respect to the wage level. The wage
setting curve WS is a downward-sloping function of the level of employment re-
lative to labour supply; it depends positively on the level of productivity, on un-
employment benefits and on the tax wedge. The LD curve is the price-determined
labour demand curve of firms; it is an upward-sloping function of the wage level.
The LD curve depends positively on technological progress, on the capital stock
and on aggregate demand, and negatively on the degree of monopoly power on
the product market, as measured by the mark-up of prices over marginal costs.
The intersection of the WS and the LD curves defines the equilibrium rate of
employment (and unemployment) where the mark-up of prices over wages is con-
sistent with the mark-up of wages over prices.
If we ignore trend improvements in productivity that move, ceteris paribus, the
LD and the WS curve simultaneously, our argument implies that the wage setting
function has shifted inwards because of the rise in the tax wedge. This has led to
a lower level of employment (N2). On the other hand, the increase in labour sup-
ply through immigration from the East has been incorporated into wage settle-
ments. In our model, this would imply a simultaneous outward movement of the
WS and the LS curve. The wage hikes of 1991-92 and of 1995 (inward shift of
                                                
66 Bundesregierung (1998), chapter E.3, Deutsche Bundesbank (1998), pp. 11.
67 See in particular Lindbeck (1993), chapter 4.– 47 –
the WS curve)68 were, except for the wedge-effect, reversed in the following
years. One may argue that firms have become more careful with respect to their
hiring decision because episodes of aggressive wage policies have undermined
the credibility of unions to deliver, when necessary, a lasting wage restraint.69
However, the sharp and sustained wage restraint since 1996 and our econometric
model suggest that this reasoning does not carry the weight of evidence.
A second major cause for the increase in unemployment was the inward shift
of the LD function following the succession of negative demand shocks, namely
the consequences of sharp monetary restraint (1992-93), fiscal restraint and cur-
rency overvaluation (1994-95), and continued fiscal restraint and depressed con-
sumer demand (1996-97). The important point here is that the sustained slack in
demand has led to a slower growth of the capital stock and consequently to a
shortage of capital relative to the WS curve.70 This shortage of capital can be ex-
                                                
68 For the matter of simplification, we ignore instances where firm are not on their LD curve and
unions are not on their WS curve. Due to nominal inertia, this is typically the case in times of
macroeconomic shocks that render expectations inconsistent while cost of adjustment prevent
quick changes of prices and wages.
69  As stressed by the Council of Economic Experts (1997), p. 9.
70 The view that a sustained slack in investment is a major cause behind the rise in unemployment
has also been endorsed by the Council of Economic Experts and by the major economic re-
search institutes. However, many economist believe that there is always a possibility to substi-
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plained by a high net-closure rate among firms that can be observed for the last
several years and by an insufficient replacement of scraped vintages of the sur-
viving firms. The inward shift in the LD curve explains why a wage restraint in
reaction to rising unemployment (movement down the WS curve) has not led to
an increase in employment. Moreover, one might argue that the disinflationary
impulse of wage restraint invited the Bundesbank to lower its inflation target. In
turn, a lower growth rate of money supply may have prevented positive real ba-
lance effects of falling prices on aggregate demand.
Moreover, in face of a weak and uncertain product demand, there is a clear in-
centive on behalf of the firms to increase hours and work effort of the existing
work force first and to expand employment only if the demand expansion is sus-
tained.71 This is because costs of dismissal are relatively high and many firms
make extensive use of firm-specific human capital. Hence, hiring new workers
implies substantial investment on behalf of the firms. This investment is sunk
cost; if firms have to dismiss workers because of an unexpected decline in prod-
uct demand, they cannot recover them. Hence, a sustained slump may lead to a
further inward shift of the LD curve.
Nevertheless, the present situation of low employment (N3) is not stable. In
absence of any further adverse demand shock, investment will gradually recover,
in particular because profitability is fairly high. Macroeconomic and structural
policies can principally accelerate recovery. However, the scope for expansionary
macroeconomic policy is limited. Although the extremely low rate of inflation
suggests that the Bundesbank could further lower the interest rate, a major policy
shift in the lieu of the European Monetary Union would only be feasible in agree-
ment with the other participating countries. The sustained fiscal deficit has large-
ly deprived fiscal policy from room for manoeuvre. Structural policies to pro-
mote employment are more difficult to implement and less effective in a situation
of insufficient demand. A tax reform could principally accelerate investment de-
mand but it would be most effective if combined with budget deficits or further
expenditure cuts. For both, there is not much scope.
                                                
tute capital by labour. Hence, capital is never too short, if wages are sufficiently flexible. This
may be the case. However, with the possible exception of Japan, we are unaware of any OECD
economy that exhibits this kind of extreme wage flexibility in the short run.
71  Abraham and Houseman (1993).– 49 –
Hence, we expect that the LD curve will only gradually shift outwards. If a
sustained period of mass unemployment leads to a loss of skills among long-term
unemployed, the pressure of high unemployment on wage setting will gradually
decline, leading to an inward shift of the WS curve.
5.3 An alternative policy mix
Our analysis suggests that the unification shock hit policy makers not fully pre-
pared to master the challenges ahead. Where West Germany’s inherited institu-
tions and policies were principally capable of dealing with these challenges, they
performed remarkably well. Germany’s foreign policy has rightly been consid-
ered a great success. The Federal Republic’s law and public administration were
efficiently implemented in the East. The enormous resources channelled into the
rebuilding of the infrastructure laid foundations for the catching-up process. The
privatisation policy by the Treuhandanstalt was criticised for various reasons, but
after all, privatisation was completed within four years.72 This has few parallels
in Eastern Europe. However, where the challenges demanded unorthodox poli-
cies and major sacrifices, unification was far less successful. The main flaw was
an improper assignment of macroeconomic policies, including the institutional
setting for collective bargaining in the East. What were the alternatives?
A realistic alternative to the policies chosen in the East would have included a
conversion factor of 3 GDR-mark per D-mark instead of the 1 to 1 rate in the
currency union, a social contract to prevent extreme wage increases backed by a
substantial increase in disposable incomes through direct transfers, and the intro-
duction of unemployment benefits that were not tied to the wage level. Although
the direct interference of the government in the collective bargaining process of
the private sector is not permitted by the German constitution, the government
was initially the owner of almost all East German firms. The government had
therefore every right to assume ownership responsibility in collective bargaining.
A policy of a realistic exchange rate and wage restraint would have only worked
as a package. Without an institutionalised wage restraint, the benefits from a
more realistic exchange rate would have been wiped out by even higher wage in-
creases. A social contract between the government and the unions to prevent ex-
                                                
72 For more details, see Brücker (1997).– 50 –
cessive wage increases would have broken down for political reasons, if the tran-
sition crisis had increased the misery in the East, while it would have broken
down for economic reasons without the threat of income losses through unem-
ployment. It is perhaps fair to argue that initially, appropriate policies were not
chosen because of uncertainty about the likely developments after the currency
union. However, at the end of 1990, the true extent of the transition crisis and the
labour market slump became apparent. The failure of the government to reverse
its labour market policy from 1991 on can no longer be attributed to forecasting
errors.
Although a substantial part of the transfers to the East was endogenous to the
wage-setting mechanism rather than a conscious political decision, we may ne-
vertheless ask whether the actual amount of transfers could have been financed
other than by increasing the deficit and the social security contributions, later fol-
lowed by an increase in income taxes and a moderate increase in value-added
taxes. Under the condition that the investment rate in the West should have
remained constant, the principal alternatives of fiscal policy would have been (i)
an increase in the value-added tax by several percentage points, (ii) substantial
cuts in public consumption expenditures, (iii) an accelerated out-phasing of sub-
sidies to ailing sectors in the West and (iv) an increase in public borrowing just
high enough to generate revenues for investment expenditures in the East.
It is not easy to co-ordinate this kind of fiscal policy in a federal state where
the central government, the federal states and the communities have their own
claims on taxes and expenditures, while vested interests prevent policy makers
from setting new priorities in a flexible way. However, the advent of unification
was a unique occasion. Initially, people were prepared to accept major sacrifices.
Therefore, major tax increases and deep cuts in public expenditures would have
faced much less resistance than during times of ‘normal business’. This oppor-
tunity was missed. The government was initially convinced that unification
would be largely self-financing through the revenues generated by the privatisa-
tion of East Germany’s state sector. Moreover, the government felt that the an-
nouncement of budget cuts and tax increases for the West might endanger its
victory in the December 1990 general election, although the political opposition
was demanding nothing less. As the West German economy started to slide into– 51 –
its worst postwar recession in 1992, the euphoria of unification disappeared. Fis-
cal policy had returned to ‘normal business’.
The choice for a fiscal restraint at the onset of unification would have given
the Bundesbank an opportunity for more monetary accommodation of the unifica-
tion process without sacrificing the goal of a reasonably low rate of inflation. A
more-restrictive fiscal policy and a less-restrictive monetary policy would have
lessened the adverse affects of German unification on the participating econo-
mies of the EMS; it would most likely have prevented the EMS crisis of 1992
and the overshooting appreciation thereafter. Although it would not have preven-
ted a recession, the recession would have been less severe. An increase in the
value-added tax of several percentage points would have created inflationary
pressure if unions had attempted to shift the increasing tax onto firms. However,
given the historically exceptional situation, an income policy to achieve a tempo-
rary wage restraint would certainly not have been out of reach, particularly if the
burden of unification had been more equally shouldered.
Under this alternative macroeconomic policy mix, the decline in employment
in the East would most likely have been substantially smaller, the economy in the
West would have been less overheated, the subsequent recession would have
been less severe, and the room for anti-cyclical monetary and fiscal policies to
manoeuvre in recent years would have been much greater, even under the con-
straint of the Maastricht convergence criteria. We suggest that under a less unco-
ordinated, contradictory and procyclical policy mix, West Germany would have
experienced a steady recovery of output and employment from the last recession.
Although Germany’s unemployment rate would have increased, it would have
been largely because of the unavoidable transformation crisis in the East.
While there is no space to discuss in detail why these kinds of policies were
not realised nor even seriously considered, it should nevertheless be mentioned
that it was not the lack of competent advice, from various sources. Inadequate
policies can partly be attributed to the government’s unrealistic assessment of the
challenges ahead. More important, however, was the government’s failure to un-
derstand that unification required a very different assignment of macroeconomic
policies than those prevailing during the 1980s. This may perhaps be a lasting
legacy of supply-side economics.– 52 –
6 Final Assessment
According to a widespread view, Germany’s unemployment crisis is caused by ri-
gid labour markets, low profitability and increasing international competition.
We argue that this view does not provide a convincing explanation for the dra-
matic rise in Germany’s unemployment rate since 1989, first because no distinc-
tion is drawn between the situation in the Eastern part of Germany and that in the
Western part of Germany, and second because supply-side conditions in the We-
stern part of Germany have not generally deteriorated. We argue that Germany’s
slump is the result of a series of adverse supply and demand shocks since unifica-
tion. Supply shocks dominated in the East, demand shocks in the West. These
shocks were mainly policy-induced. The adoption of an extremely overvalued ex-
change rate and rapid wage increases in East Germany magnified the general
problems of transition, resulting in a loss of employment of more than a third and
a sustained structural weakness of its economy. The wage explosion was made
possible by the government’s failure to create a proper institutional framework
for wage negotiations. We suggest that the unification shock to the East contribu-
ted at least 2 percentage points to the rise in Germany’s overall unemployment
rate in the early 1990s. Another 0.5 percent has to be attributed to the out-pha-
sing of active labour market programs and the depression in the construction sec-
tor, following the cuts in government subsidies. Moreover, to each registered un-
employed person in the East we have to add another person who is financed by
labour market programs other than unemployment insurance.
The empirical evidence suggests that macroeconomic supply-side conditions
in West Germany have not generally deteriorated since the late 1980s. The rate of
return on fixed capital in the business sector remains higher than during the
1980s. The burden of financing unification has largely been shifted onto the
shoulders of labour and of future generations while the effective average tax rate
on profit income has continued to decline. The behaviour of long-term interest
rates does not suggest that the budget deficit led to a significant crowding-out of
private sector activities. The growing net-outflow of FDI that has served as key
evidence for West Germany’s structural supply problem appears to be largely due
to a failure of Germany’s balance of payments statistics to record inflowing FDI
properly. Econometric evidence suggests a structural break in aggregate wage-
setting in West Germany, with increased nominal flexibility in recent years and– 53 –
insignificant persistent effects since the 1980s. Hence, aggregate wage setting in
West Germany is highly responsive to unemployment.73 Increasing mismatch
does not provide a good explanation for the labour market slump, because unem-
ployment has sharply increased across all skill-categories, and skilled workers
without university degrees were affected most.
We attribute some 1.5 to 2.5 percentage points of the present unemployment
rate to the weak economic growth of the last several years and the impact of the
increasing tax wedge on the wage level. Weak growth has been largely the conse-
quence of uncoordinated, contradictory and procyclical macroeconomic policies
that have been adopted since unification, while the increasing tax wedge has been
mostly driven by the decision of the government to finance part of unification
through the social security system and by the costs of high unemployment.
Let us recapitulate the unfolding of events. Unification gave a boost to the
West German economy largely through a huge fiscal expenditure impulse and the
surge of demand from the East. Instead of financing the massive transfers to the
East via higher value-added taxes and lower public consumption expenditures in
the West, the government raised the deficit and social security contributions sig-
nificantly. In order to contain inflationary pressures that were believed to ema-
nate from unification, monetary policy opted for extreme restriction from 1990 to
1993 throughout, raising the short-term interest rate substantially above the long-
term rate. The overheating of the economy through fiscal policy led to an arti-
ficial build-up of employment and capacities in the West, while parts of Europe
were already in recession. The increase in social security contributions created
additional wage pressure because unions were not prepared to pay the bill. After
the effects of fiscal expansion had petered out, West Germany entered its worst
postwar recession. The effect of monetary restriction was magnified by an appre-
ciation of the D-mark following the EMS-crisis in late 1992. Unemployment in-
creased substantially in 1993 and 1994.
                                                
73 This may sound implausible in face of the frequently cited evidence on West Germany’s ex-
tremely high wage level. However, all of these data refer only to manufacturing production
workers. Lindlar and Scheremet (1998) have constructed a new database for the business sector
and the overall economy. These data show that West Germany belongs to a larger group of high
wage economies, as do the U.S.– 54 –
The onsetting upswing in 1994 was supported by strong wage moderation and
by a slow monetary relaxation, while fiscal policies, aimed at meeting the Maas-
tricht convergence criteria, became increasingly restrictive. Germany would have
experienced a sustained but moderate upswing, had the exchange rate not contin-
ued to appreciate in real terms in 1995, resulting in an overvaluation of approxi-
mately 16 percent. In consequence, unemployment started to increase again. This
led to very strong wage moderation by unions while productivity continued to in-
crease. Without any compensatory expansion from monetary and fiscal policy or
from exports, wage restraint depressed consumption, domestic demand and in-
vestment. As a concomitant, the rate of inflation dropped close to zero while pro-
fits soared. Since 1996, the depreciation of the D-mark paved the way for an ex-
port boom but so far, the external impulse has not been strong enough to boost
creeping domestic demand. Under these circumstances, there has been little in-
centive for firms to increase investment and employment.
We suggest that employment policy has to address three problems: unemploy-
ment due to a demand slump in Germany as a whole, unemployment due to ex-
cessive wages in the East, and structural unemployment in the West. The most
promising measures for reducing unemployment appear to be those aimed at cre-
ating the conditions for a sustained increase in demand, because demand-defi-
cient unemployment is usually the most easy kind to combat. Moreover, a lasting
recovery of the German economy is likely to provide a better climate for econ-
omic policies addressed at the problems of post-unification unemployment in the
East and of structural unemployment in the West. The dilemma, however, is two-
fold: the ruling economic policy dogma has effectively stigmatised Keynesian re-
commendations as a dangerous idea of the past, while Germany’s commitment to
Maastricht and the sustained fiscal deficit have largely deprived the government
of its means to follow those recommendations. In consequence, the recovery of
investment and employment will only be gradual. It is the unemployed who will
have to pay the price for policy mistakes of the past. Perhaps a lasting price, if
the demand-deficient unemployment of today becomes the structural unemploy-
ment of tomorrow.– 55 –
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